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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the emergence and implications of local resistance against
the practice of liberal peace-building in post-conflict Kosovo, as pursued by the
international community and local authorities. Exploring the prospects and
limitations of local resistance, as articulated through social movements
and institutionalised forms of politics, enables us to examine the applicability
and potential implications of post-liberal and emancipatory peace, approaches
recently propogated by critical approaches to peace-building. Drawing on an
original analysis of the discourse and affirmative action of local resistance
against the international governance of Kosovo, this paper will argue that
different types of local resistance articulate a thin line between ethical,
emancipatory and exclusionary practices. Due to the inherent contradictions
of resistance movements, the challenges associated with local ownership,
grassroots democratisation, and the emancipation and empowerment of local
agency cannot be resolved entirely. Indeed, there is a persistent danger that
subalterns articulate their needs and interests not only according to an
acceptable public transcript for the group’s inner dynamics, but also in relation
to the dominant authority, whether it is local or international. This paper
illustrates that where there is power there will be resistance, and where there is
resistance there will be exclusion and further subordination.
INTRODUCTION
When NATO troops entered Kosovo in June 1999, thousands of Kosovars took to
the streets to welcome the presence that would liberate them from the regime of
Serbia’s Slobodan Milosˇevic´. The ensuing establishment of the UN interim
administration, which, alongside many international aid organisations, managed
Kosovo’s affairs, was welcomed by the local population for providing valuable
assistance in reconstructing destroyed livelihoods, establishing basic public
services and providing basic goods and welfare. As time passed and conditions
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improved in Kosovo, however, new concerns emerged that gradually undermined
the credibility and legitimacy of the international presence. As the Kosovars
demanded broader self-governance from the UN administration, the political
agenda of both local and international stakeholders began to diverge. Friction
developed around a number of issues: the delay in clarifying Kosovo’s statehood;
incompatible political agendas; political and aid conditionality; and the extensive
power and undemocratic and unaccountable practices of the international
presence. These issues, against a backdrop of fragmented ethnic relations and
protracted underdevelopment, gave rise to local resistance against the decisions
and actions associated with the liberal peace-building agenda in Kosovo.
The nature of local resistance to the international governance of post-
conflict societies shares many similarities with local resistance in colonial and
post-colonial contexts.1 Those who were once welcomed and considered as
liberators, are soon seen as new occupiers. Whereas the international commu-
nity, in the context of peace-building, does not seek explicitly to extract and
exploit the local resources of post-conflict societies, but rather seeks to provide
external resources to the formerly conflicted society, there are other factors of
an exploitive but non-material nature in the relationship.2 Recognising that
peace is always for someone and for some purpose is essential to understanding
thoroughly the complex implications of peace-building in conflict-affected
societies. A relationship of accommodating multilateral interests develops
between the peace-builders and the post-conflict society. Delivering develop-
ment aid and building a neo-liberal economy enables international actors to
benefit from trade, loans and other investments. Changing regimes and building
democracy creates new partnerships, security communities and loyalties, and
space for unlimited exploitation. Deploying military troops also serves the
purpose of training troops in dangerous terrains, and practicing modern
military technology and doctrines. Establishing the rule of law prevents
terrorism, organised crime, trafficking and asylum claims. Establishing
human-rights regimes benefits the normative aspect of international institu-
tions, and global governance more generally.
This mutually exploitive relationship has recently been addressed by those
advocating new critical approaches to peace-building, who argue that as a result
of interaction between the local and international actors and their respective
cultures, identities, needs and interests, hybrid forms of peace are emerging that
impact on both local populations and the international presence.3 Hence, they
recognise the multi-dimensional nature of power manifested not only by the
powerful international actors or ruling local elites, but also reflected by the
weak and powerless population through resistance, disobedience and silent and
symbolic defiance evident in the terrains of everyday life in post-conflict
situations. Building on these premises, this paper provides original analysis on
the emergence and implications of local resistance against the practice of liberal
peace-building in post-conflict Kosovo, as pursued by the international
community and local authorities. Drawing on local knowledge, this paper
seeks to shed light on the prospects for and limitations of local resistance, as
1For a comparison between post-colonial and post-conflict contexts, see Edward W. Said,
Culture and imperialism (London, 1993); Mark Duffield, Development, security and unending war
(Cambridge, 2007); Ilan Kapoor, The postcolonial politics of development (London, 2008); and
John Gledhill, Power and its disguises (2nd edn, London, 2000).
2Roland Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, 36 (2010),
33765.
3Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-liberal peace (London, 2011); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh,
‘Introduction: liberal peace in dispute’, in Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (ed.), Rethinking the liberal
peace: external models and local alternatives (London, 2011), 116: 3.
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articulated through social movements and institutionalised forms of politics.
This, in turn, facilitates an examination of the applicability and potential
implications of post-liberal and emancipatory peace, as recently propagated by
the critical perspectives on peace-building.
Local resistance towards international governance in Kosovo is articulated
by different actors and through different means. The most vocal resistance
emanates from the Movement for Self-Determination (Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje),
whose main goal is the realisation of external and internal self-determination of
Kosovo’s majority population, as well as the re-adjustment and reduction of the
protracted and extensive powers of international governance in Kosovo. To
achieve these goals, Vete¨vendosje has combined popular demonstrations,
citizen mobilisation and education with public performances, slogans and
media communication campaigns for ‘naming and shaming’ political leaders, as
well as a hidden transcript of resistance through everyday acts of disobedience.
Resistance is also articulated by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) war
veterans, who have used political pressure through public statements and media
appearances, and low-scale protests and threats against the international
presence, to protect the dignity and integrity of ex-combatants, and to improve
the legal and welfare conditions of their families. Other local resistance towards
the decisions and actions of the international governance in Kosovo has also
taken hybrid forms, combining institutional and cooperative aspects, or more
contentious forms of resistance such as public protests, with other hidden, silent
forms of non-cooperation. This is the case with regard to the Kosovo Women’s
Network, which seeks to support, protect and promote the rights and the
interests of women and girls in Kosovo through institutional and popular
resistance practices.
This paper argues that these types of resistance articulate a thin line between
ethical, emancipatory and exclusionary practices. In terms of ethical and
emancipatory practices, local resistance has the potential to revitalise the
political life of society, where bottom-up initiatives attempt to safeguard the
pluralist nature of public affairs, critique the contested legitimacy and authority
of local and international governance, encourage citizen activism and hold the
government accountable and responsible for its actions. Notwithstanding this,
local resistance often results in exclusionary practices that risk affecting the
subalterns who belong to minority and vulnerable communities. Exclusionary
practices are reflected through promoting nationalist ideology and denying
implicitly ethnic difference and pluralism in society. Consequently, local
resistance does not resolve entirely the issues of local ownership, grass roots
democratisation, or the emancipation and empowerment of local agency,
because there is a persistent danger that the subalterns articulate their needs
and interests in an acceptable public transcript for the inner group’s dynamics,
but also in relation to the dominant authority, whether it is local or
international. Therefore, emancipatory politics should not be seen as an
ultimate solution to post-conflict problems; instead, the ethos and nexus of
emancipation should remain the ‘immanent critique’ of dominance and power
relations within and between social groups.
The first section of this paper examines the core theoretical assumptions and
practical limitations of liberal peace-building, and then discusses the emergence
of the emancipatory peace-building argument as an alternative to the main-
stream approaches. Thus, the core debates between supporters of liberal peace-
building and the proponents of emancipatory peace-building are explored, and
some of the implications that might occur in ‘bringing in’ the emancipatory
peace perspective, or combining it with liberal approaches, are examined.
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Following this theoretical discussion, the paper then provides an original
analysis of different types of local resistance in Kosovo, to examine the
emergence of a ‘critical turn’ through social movements and bottom-up civic
initiatives, and also to consider its potential contribution towards building a
sustainable peace. The paper concludes by examining some of the inherent
pathologies and case-related implications of the discourse and practices of local
resistance and emancipatory politics in post-conflict situations.
FROM LIBERAL TO POST-LIBERAL PEACE?
Liberal peace-building and uncontentious politics
Efforts during the early 1990s to build a sustainable peace in societies
experiencing conflict using a ‘light footprint’ were ultimately insufficient for
addressing the complex problems emerging from the absence of a functional
state, an underdeveloped welfare system and ethnic division. The move to
expand the UN peace-building agenda by including state-building activities
turned to the prevailing form of liberal democracy as the optimal approach to
govern post-conflict societies, by institutionalising social practices, liberalising
the economy and transforming gradually the remaining ethnic disputes. This
approach expanded UN involvement in post-conflict societies well beyond
earlier conflict-resolution and conflict-management agendas. The expanded
agenda combined state-building and peace-building instruments. The aim of
state-building is the establishment of self-sustaining, legitimate and effective
state institutions; peace-building, on the other hand, concerns primarily the
establishment of self-sustaining peace by eradicating structural factors that
trigger violence in the first place. These two parallel and interwoven agendas are
often defined as ‘liberal peace-building’, whereby the goal of the international
military and civilian presence is to build a sustainable peace by establishing
democratic institutions, rights and civil society, and to install a neoliberal and
market-oriented economy.
Liberal peace-building operates on the assumption that building a liberal
state will produce a stable peace, because:
. democracies tend to be more peaceful;
. free elections produce democratic practices and political stability;
. the rule of law promotes effective governance;
. power-sharing arrangements promote ethnic reconciliation;
. neoliberal economic policies promote free-market and economic growth;
and
. civil society promotes human rights and social inclusion.
The liberal peace thesis encourages the development of the domestic liberal
democratic system in which:
. political and civil rights are respected and advanced;
. governments are democratically elected and exercise limited powers;
. economic activity is largely free from state intervention; and
. the social welfare of citizens is protected.4
4For an overview of the liberal peace thesis, see: Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, liberal legacies, and
foreign affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (3) 1983, 2067; Michael W. Doyle, ‘Three pillars
of the liberal peace’, American Political Science Review 99 (3) 2005, 4636; Michael W. Doyle and
Nicholas Sambanis, Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations (Princeton,
2006); Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds), Building states to build peace (London, 2008).
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However, in the practice of the international governance of post-conflict
societies, this sequence of policies is far from reality. Indeed, one of the most
distinct attributes of liberal peace-building praxis has been the promotion and
implementation of compliance politics, and the cultivation of a subserviant
political culture in post-conflict societies. According to liberal peace-building
perspectives, the creation of peace is conditional upon building a local polity,
which operates based on power-sharing arrangements, consensual decision-
making and compliance with the transitional authority.5 The nature and
intention of power-sharing arrangements, however, often discourage social
activism and political participation, seeking instead to maintain citizen
compliance with and obedience towards the authority of international
governance and local ethnic elites. In addition, the hierarchy of needs following
violent conflict prioritises humanitarian and security related needs over the
need for civic and political agency. Civil society, media and trade unions*
traditional agents of social mobilisation*are controlled by foreign donations
and conditionality, and sophisticated legal and political discourse.
One of the most important aspects of post-conflict democratisation is the
choice of electoral system.6 Most of the theoretical and policy prescriptions
suggest that a successful democratic transition in post-conflict societies is
conditional on providing maximal inclusiveness, moderation and accommoda-
tive politics that serve as incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation.7 Hence, it is
suggested that a form of proportional representation is a more suitable
institutional designs for divided societies than the majoritarian systems.8 In
the post-conflict recovery dominated by a liberal peace agenda, the main local
actors involved in power-sharing deals are either ex-combatants, war-lords or a
self-proclaimed political and civil society elite. Driven by power management
logic, these local groups are involved by internationals in order to control or
reduce local resistance from potential conflict spoilers, and as such avoid
creation of parallel political structures that would challenge the authority and
legitimacy of international peace-builders. In addition to this, power-sharing
arrangements have often discouraged citizen participation, focusing as they do
largely on ethnic elites to govern political affairs. This is mainly done to
maintain an overall stability and avoid public deliberations as a forum that
could lead to violent confrontation between different ethnic groups. However,
power sharing can affect negatively the democratisation process by excluding
moderate elites; by the fact that they lack popular support; by preventing local
ownership of political processes as a result of external intervention; and by
maintaining fragile ethnic relations as a result of group representation.9
5See: Roland Paris, At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict (Cambridge, 2004). For an
analysis of its impact in Northern Ireland, see Michael O Kelly, John Doyle and Philip J. Boland,
‘How many ways can you look at a proportion? Cross-community vote transfers in Northern
Ireland before and after the Belfast agreement’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A
(Statistics in Society) 173 (1) (2010), 21535.
6See: Oisin Tansey, Regime-change: democratization and international administration (Oxford,
2009); Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo (eds), Interim governments: institutional bridges to
peace and democracy (Washington D.C., 2007).
7See Arend Lijphart, Thinking about democracy: power sharing and majority rule in theory and
practice (London, 2008); Ian O’Flynn and David Russell (eds), Power sharing: new challenges for
divided societies (London, 2005);
8Arend Lijphart, ‘Constitutional design for divided societies’, Journal of Democracy 15 (2)
2004, 96109.
9Anna K. Jarstad, ‘Power sharing: former enemies in joint government’, in Anna K. Jarstad
and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), From war to democracy: dilemmas of peacebuilding (Cambridge, 2008),
10533: 107.
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In general, the exercise of sovereign authority by a UN-sanctioned
international administration is seen as running the risk of developing
institutions that ‘will be less the creations of the people in question, and
more products of external interests’.10 Although liberal peace-building aims to
foster self-sustaining peace through effective, legitimate self-governance, the
fact that there is extensive external involvement ‘can create new political and
economic patterns in the host society that come to rely on the continuation of
large-scale external aid and guidance’.11 By its nature, liberal peace-bulding
removes political authority from local political institutions, weakening their
capacity to develop and implement public policy and thereby creating a culture
of dependency.12 In addition to this, driven by economic, security and strategic
self-interests, states and international organisations engaged in post-conflict
reconstruction often display an unwillingness to commit sufficient resources, to
operate in a coordinated and effective manner and to be accountable for the
human-rights abuses and local damages directly caused by internationals.13
Critique and the post-liberal peace
In response to the shortcomings, failures and consequences of the practice of
liberal peace-building, a critical scholarship is emerging that seeks to
interrogate the performance, effectiveness and implications of mainstream
peace-building praxis. For some scholars, the act of immanent critique and the
promotion of emancipation in academic discourse seems to provide sufficient
level of resistance; whereas other critics demand the production of alternative
solutions to resolve the unfulfilled potential of mainstream approaches.14
Following the ‘critical turn’ in International Relations,15 critical approaches
to peace-building seek to reject or modify the propositions made by mainstream
scholars, who predominantly employ problem-solving and a positivist logic of
inference in their analyses.
Most critical approaches to peace-building provide a reflective analysis on
how liberal peace-building facilitates a counter-productive environment that
ultimately develops a weak and unaccountable local polity, fragments local
sovereignty and maintains fragile peace. They reveal a number of problematic
practices and paradoxical manifestations of liberal peace-building. First, critics
disagree with the imposed nature of democratic regimes in post-conflict
societies, as imposition undermines the legitimacy of liberal peace and also
10Christopher Bickerton, ‘State-building: exporting state failure’, in Christopher Bickerton,
Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch (eds), Politics without sovereignty: a critique of
contemporary international relations (London, 2006), 93111: 96.
11Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, Managing contradictions: the inherent dilemmas of
postwar statebuilding (Washington, D.C., 2007), 6.
12Dominik Zaum, Sovereignty paradox: the norms and politics of international statebuilding
(Oxford, 2007), 241.
13Simon Chesterman, ‘Building democracy through benevolent autocracy: consultation and
accountability in UN transitional administrations’, in Edward Newman and Roland Rich (eds),
The UN role in promoting democracy: between ideals and reality (Tokyo, 2004), 86112: 102.;
Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of peace: transforming conflict in a violent world
(Oxford, 2010).
14See, Richard Wyn Jones, ‘On emancipation: necessity, capacity, and concrete utopias’, in Ken
Booth (ed.), Critical security studies and world politics (Boulder, 2005), 21535; Tara
McCormack, Critique, security and power: the political limits to emancipatory approaches
(London, 2010); David C. Hoy, Critical resistance: from post-structuralism to post-critique,
(Cambridge, MA, 2004).
15For an overview of critical approaches to international relations, see Andrew Linklater, ‘The
achievements of critical theory’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds),
International theory: positivism and beyond (Cambridge, 1996) 27998.
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undermines the prerogrative of local people to chose the form of political
system they want to establish in their society. Second, externally imposed
democratisation insists on immediate results, ignoring the fact that the
democratisation dynamics should be locally driven and locally owned in order
to ensure sustainability. Third, often the promotion of democratic and multi-
ethnic parties triggers identity-based violence and exacerbates further social
fragmentation. Fourth, democratisation processes often neglect the importance
and influence of informal institutions and local culture, and may not take into
consideration how the local population might react to or resist externally
designed institutions.
In turn, critical approaches attempt to provide alternative solutions to
the shortcomings of externally imposed democratisation, varying between
approaches that favour inaction and non-intervention to approaches that
suggest small-scale engagement. Some advocate larger local ownership and
consent, which will empower local agency while providing external actors with
legitimacy and effectiveness. Others suggest adapting democratic principles
that recognise local contexts and empower local populations, while accepting
indigenous forms of governance. These propositions advocate a hybrid model,
combining local indigenous principles with more liberal and cosmopolitan
principles, thus incorporating local perspectives in the decision-making process,
bringing everyday processes of society to the forefront.16
The most vocal critic of liberal peace-building, Oliver P. Richmond,
advocates a new critical research programme, while consolidating a more
systematic and pragmatic conceptualisation of peace. Drawing on feminist
notions of empathy,17 post-colonial worldviews of resistance and hybridity,18
and the sociological concepts of the local and the everyday,19 Richmond argues
that liberal peace-buiding distances individuals in post-conflict societies, with
the result that local agency is expressed through everyday practices, indicating
forms of resistance that in turn is reshaping mainstream liberal peace towards a
local-liberal hybridity.20 Richmond defines this as ‘post-liberal peace’; i.e., the
transformation of liberal peace to engage proactively with the local, recognise
their needs and seek for their support and consent. For him, ‘post-liberal peace’
has a transitory and fluid nature, which seeks to emphasise ‘the everyday’, ‘local
agency’ and ‘local context’ as a space to reclaim a new social contact, which
recognises the plurality of peace, is open to customary governance and
prioritises social empowerment and welfare. The notion of empathy, for
Richmond, is a connector between the local and international. Undergoing a
post-liberal peace, where local needs, customs and cultures are recognised and
promoted accordingly, the prospects for local-liberal hybridity emerge as a
16See, Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, Millennium*Journal of
International Studies, 38 (3) 2010, 66592; Roger Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding and local
resistance: hybrid forms of peace (Hampshire, 2011); David Roberts, Liberal peacebuilding and
global governance: beyond the metropolis (London, 2011); David Chandler, International
statebuilding: the rise of post-liberal governance (London and New York, 2010). Chandler takes
this further, linking the debate on R2P to the aftermath of the international intervention in
Kosovo, in David Chandler, ‘Unravelling the paradox of the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’’, Irish
Studies in International Affairs 20 (2009), 2740.
17Christine Sylvester, ‘Empathetic cooperation: a feminist method for IR’, Millennium*
Journal of International Studies 23 (2) 1994, 31534.
18Homi Bhabha, The location of culture (London, 1994); Kapoor, Post-colonial politics of
development.
19Michel de Certeau, The practice of everyday life (California, 1984); James C. Scott, Weapons
of the weak: everyday peasant resistance (New Haven, 1985).
20Richmond, Post-liberal peace; Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’.
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promising approach to achieve a sustainable peace and social contract in post-
conflict situations.
Richmond grounds his post-liberal peace thesis in a thorough critique of
liberal peace-building in theory and praxis. He holds that as a result of focusing
on an international, regional and state level peace, liberal peace-building has
failed to engage with the local context, everyday forms of peace, care, empathy
or emancipation.21 Hence, he argues that ‘without an engagement with needs
and welfare, peacebuilding will not lead to a sustainable outcome because there
are few peace incentives for citizens or elites’.22 The notion of ‘everyday’ is
central to understanding this emerging new conceptualisation and contextual-
isation of post-liberal peace. Whereas most critical scholars seek to advance the
emancipation argument by suggesting the extermination of the notions of state
and political authority, and seek global solutions for injustice, Richmond
suggests reclaiming emancipation from the everyday and the most local levels of
society. He defines an emancipatory peace as:
an everyday form of peace, offering care, respecting but also mediating
culture and identity, institutions, and custom, providing for needs, and
assisting the most marginalised in their local, state, regional, and interna-
tional contexts.23
According to Richmond, the everyday is seen as ‘a site of dynamics
including resistance and politicisation, solidarity, local agency, hybridity, and
also of passivity and depoliticisation’.24 Focusing on the everyday, post-liberal
peace is able to understand contextual manifestations of peace, where citizen-
ship, rights and duties have an everyday meaning, rather than constructing
peace-building models at the global level or constructing virtual peace by
relying on institutions or elite power capacity.25
Certain theoretical aspects propagated by post-liberal peace are still too
broad and difficult to operationalise, and also contradictory and ambiguous in
notions such as the local agency and everyday. The notion of ‘the everyday’, for
instance, is difficult to conceptualise, as it can mean a wide range of things, thus
obstructing any systematic and generalisable inferences.26 Richmond does not
explain in detail how post-liberal peace can: reduce ethnic tensions; resolve self-
determination and recursive secession attempts; and design community and
institutional decision-making in deeply divided societies. While in theory
Richmond seems to favour local agency and self-government, as well as locally
initiated political developments, in the context of Kosovo he seems to find
problematic Kosovo’s claim for statehood, considering it as a monopolisation
of the entire state-building and peace-building process by the Kosovo
Albanians.27 Richmond also critiques the division and entrenchment of Bosnian
society along ethnic lines and the absence of pluralist civil society, whereas, in
essence, one could argue that such an ethno-cultural condition might represent
the will, needs, interests and local context of each ethnic community in
Bosnia.28 Indeed, these ‘bitter’ post-conflict developments are also forms of
21Richmond, Post-liberal peace, 310.
22Richmond, Post-liberal peace, 34.
23Richmond, Post-liberal peace, 3.
24Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, 671.
25Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, 671.
26See John Roberts, Philosophizing the everyday: revolutionary praxis and the fate of the cultural
theory (London, 2006).
27Richmond, Post-liberal peace, 81.
28Richmond, Post-liberal peace, 73.
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local agency and resistance, mainly in response to contextual hostilities between
disputant groups, but they are also responses to an externally imposed liberal
peace agenda, transitional justice mechanisms and social transformation
technologies. This paper intends to contribute to these theoretical debates by
examining the nature of local resistance towards international governance in
post-conflict Kosovo.
THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF KOSOVO: 19992011
In June 1999, NATO’s military intervention was followed by a civil intervention
when the UN was tasked to govern Kosovo through its Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo. UNMIK was to provide Kosovo with a transitional
administration, while establishing and overseeing the development of provi-
sional democratic, self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. Under Security Council
resolution 1244, UNMIK was mandated to: (a) establish and maintain public
order and internal security; (b) oversee the repatriation and reintegration of
refugees and internally displaced persons; (c) perform basic civil administra-
tions; (d) develop local political institutions and hold elections; (e) build civil
society; and (f) promote economic reconstruction and development.29 The
special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) was the head of UNMIK
and the highest international civilian official in Kosovo. Indeed, the SRSG
enjoyed maximum civilian executive powers flowing from resolution 1244 and
was the final authority on their interpretation.30 UNMIK was structured
around four pillars. The first two pillars, coordinated by UNMIK, dealt with
public security issues and the judicial system, and managed domestic public
administration and the international civilian presence. The third pillar was
administrated by the OSCE, which dealt with democratisation through
institution building; strengthening local police and municipal authorities; and
promoted the rule of law, human rights and an independent media and an
active civil society. The forth pillar mandated the EU to undertake economic
reconstruction and development, including privatisation, operating customs
and resolving property issues. With such a broadly mandated international
administration, UNMIK was criticised for ‘having too many masters’.31
Between 1999 and 2003, UNMIK delayed transferring power to local
institutions, and did little to promote local ownership of the reconstruction
processes. This was partly due to Kosovo’s unresolved political status and the
fear that transferring power to Kosovo’s local institutions would be viewed by
Kosovo Serbs as a threat. In an attempt to balance these fears, the SRSG to
Kosovo, Michael Steiner, had outlined benchmarks in April 2002 that ‘should
be achieved before launching a discussion on status’.32 The externally led efforts
to build state institutions and a stable peace in Kosovo favoured and cultivated
a strategy of creating a multi-party political system that would accommodate
consensual politics, providing privileged status for minority groups and
discourage extremist ideologies and their groupings. During this transitional
29UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.
30UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/799 (New York, 1999).
31Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at any price: how the world failed Kosovo (London, 2006),
249.
32UN Security Council, Meeting, New York (S/PV.4518), 26 June 2002, available at: http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
Kos%20SPV4559.pdf (29 July 2011).
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period, the state of affairs was maintained by a sophisticated system. UN
international staff directed most government departments, whereas subordinate
positions and gradually some of the departments came under local directors.
Still, the UN administration held executive power to overrule any decision
coming from the local actors and institutions that was considered incompatible
with the interests of the ‘stability paradigm’ in Kosovo, thus excluding and
punishing any social force that was acting against the interests of the
international administration in Kosovo. This set of disciplinary mechanisms
created political parties servile to the international community and unaccount-
able and irresponsible to Kosovo citizens in general. The party development
was largely supported by foreign assistance, which detached the party
dependency from the membership support, and thus created a top-down
relationship and discouraged bottom-up policy input.
As the Kosovars wanted greater self-governance from the UN administra-
tion, the political agendas of local and international stakeholders diverged,
causing friction and mutual antagonism. By 2004, events on the ground,
including the March 2004 riots, put discussions of Kosovo’s status firmly on the
agenda. Two years and two rounds of UN-led negotiations between the Serb
authorities and Kosovo representatives failed to achieve a consensual solution.
Given this deadlock, a group of predominantly Western countries saw no
alternative but to support UN secretary-general special envoy for the future
status process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari’s recommendation to give Kosovo
‘independence, supervised initially by the international community’ and to
implement his Comprehensive Status Settlement (CSS).33 As Ahtisaari’s
proposal did not receive sufficient support within the UN Security Council,
due to the expected negative veto of Russia and China, the United States
together with a group of the European Union member states facilitated the
unilateral declaration of independence. Accordingly, on 17 February 2008,
Kosovo’s political representatives declared Kosovo ‘an independent and
sovereign state’.34 The Declaration of Independence was framed ‘in full
accordance’ with Ahtisaari’s proposal and committed to future cooperation
with the international community to ensure ‘Kosovo’s future peace, prosperity
and stability’.35 Despite its contested status, Kosovo has to date been recognised
by 81 out of 192 UN member states.
The Ahtisaari proposal envisaged a new format for the international
presence, tasked to supervise the status settlement and gradually pass full
governance power to the local authorities. However, the international presence
in post-independence Kosovo does not operate as envisaged in Ahtisaari’s
proposal. Due to a lack of consensus in their respective organisations, UNMIK,
the OSCE and the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
(EULEX) remain neutral with regard to Kosovo’s status. Although they
formally remain status-neutral under the framework of UNSC resolution 1244,
these three organisations differ when it comes to practical cooperation with
33UN Secretary-General, Report of the special envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s
future status, S/2007/168 (New York, 2007), 3. For a contribution by Ahtisaari see Martti
Ahtisaari, ‘Conflict resolution: the case of Kosovo’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 19
(2008), 1838.
34Kosovo Assembly, Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008, Prishtina,
available at: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid2,128,1635 (14 July 2011); hereafter cited as
Declaration of Independence.
35Declaration of Independence.
108 Irish Studies in International Affairs
their Kosovo counterparts, and their recognition of the empirical or factual
sovereignty of Kosovo. By contrast, the International Civilian Office (ICO) is
the only status-supportive international body.36 The ICO is mandated to
strengthen Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty by supporting the implementation of
decentralisation and the protection of minorities, and by improving governance
and ‘implicitly’ abolishing so-called Serbian parallel structures, to minimise
Serbian interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs.
Although EULEX operates under UNSC resolution 1244, its mission aims
to strengthen the rule of law sector by advising, mentoring and monitoring the
work of courts, police and customs that function as institutions of an
independent Kosovo.37 Despite its commitment to remain neutral regarding
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, the UN presence in Kosovo
undertakes three main functions: (a) monitoring and reporting; (b) facilitating
dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade on issues of practical concern; and (c)
facilitating, where necessary and possible, Kosovo’s engagement in interna-
tional agreements.38 UNMIK still holds some administrative functions in the
north of Kosovo, where its key partners are Serb local political structures. The
OSCE continues to support local governance and communities in Kosovo, but
operates under a status-neutral framework. OSCE activities are now reconfi-
gured to focus on early warning and proactive monitoring of local institutions
and community rights.
During the two phases of international administration (before and after
Kosovo’s independence), the international community together with local
actors failed to lay the seeds of a stable peace in Kosovo. While the
international community was interested in maintaining a fragile peace and
stability, Kosovar authorities demanded independence and state-building,
allowing Belgrade to exploit the opportunity created by this dual agenda to
promote its own national interests in the bargaining process in Kosovo.
Subsequently, the contested nature of Kosovo’s independence led to multiple
international organisations acting with overlapping, and status-neutral man-
dates, thus challenging the consolidation of independent Kosovo’s domestic and
external sovereignty.39
THE EMERGENCE AND ARTICULATION OF LOCAL RESISTANCE
Singer argues that citizens are obliged to obey the law for as long as organised
society functions on a democratic and inclusive basis, and the state provides
public services and goods equally to all its members, despite their distinct
identity-related differences. 40 Resistance is justifiable in seeking to reform the
system, while opening new space for positive political changes through non-
violent methods; revolutionary means, however, may ruin society.41 This was
36For more details on the ICO work in Kosovo, see: http://www.ico-kos.org/ico/index.php?
id8 (14 July 2011).
37EU Council, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008, on the European Union
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo (Brussels, 2008), 2.
38UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/354 (New York, 2008), 5.
39Ge¨zim Visoka and Grace Bolton, ‘The complex nature and implications of international
engagement after Kosovo’s independence’, Civil wars 13 (2) 2011, 189214.
40Peter Singer, Democracy and disobedience (Oxford, 1992).
41See: Lawrence Quill, Civil disobedience (un)common sense in mass democracies (London,
2009); John Rawls, A theory of justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971); Hugo A. Bedau, (ed.)
Disobedience in focus (London and New York, 1991); Gene Sharp, The politics of nonviolent
struggle: power and struggle (New York, 1973).
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clearly articulated during the Enlightenment by John Locke, who asserted that
any individual citizen, when abused by the rulers of the state, has the right to
disobey their commands, break their laws and even raise the issue of and
demand replacing the rulers and changing the laws.42 Although more
ambiguously, even Hobbes, who is characterised as strong supporter of state
authority, recognised some rights of resistance that are inalienable, related to
the right of self-defense from imminent threat and collective self-preservation,
which give people the right to disobey the laws of their political community and
challenge the social contract and the political Leviathan.43
In post-conflict environments, local forms of resistance often invoke
justifications related to the undemocratic nature of international administra-
tions, where different ethnic groups or social movements reject and refuse to
recognise their authority. Those resisting invoke their right to disobey, as their
consent and interests were not considered when the post-conflict mission was
established, or when the new constitution was written, or because the
internationals involved selected only subservient or beholden local actors to
participate in the determination of the nature of the political and legal system.
In Kosovo, local resistance towards the international presence is articulated by
different actors using different methods. The resistance is articulated mainly
through: popular demonstrations, citizen mobilisation and education; public
performances, slogans and media communication; campaigns for ‘naming and
shaming’ political leaders; as well as institutional and cooperative techniques
and more hidden forms of resistance through everyday acts of disobedience.
The remainder of this paper will discuss the emergence, activities and
implications of local resistance in Kosovo.
Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje (Movement for Self-Determination)
Responding to the gap in citizen activism created by donor-oriented civil
society groups, and rejecting international governance, as well as its local
counterparts, a new social movement emerged in Kosovo in 2004. Le¨vizja
Vete¨vendosje (the Movement for Self-Determination) emphasised the need for
ethical and accountable politics and local autonomy from external rule, and it
incorporated a nationalist discourse for popular self-determination as a
manifestation of direct democracy. Vete¨vendosje is led and inspired by Albin
Kurti, a former Kosovo-Albanian student leader who was a political prisoner
during the last years of the Milosˇevic´ regime. Between 2004 and 2010,
Vete¨vendosje acted as a social movement and organised protests against the
UN administration in Kosovo, the final status negotiations and the indepen-
dence settlement plan. In late 2010, Vete¨vendosje expanded its activity and
registered as a political party (citizen initiative) to run in the national elections
in Kosovo, following which it institutionalised its influence by gaining the third-
largest share of the vote. The analysis of Vete¨vendosje that follows here reflects
on several attributes of the post-liberal and emancipatory peace thesis
articulated through an unanticipated local agency, which was nurtured in
Kosovo’s case by the constant delegitimation of the international governance
and its local partners, and the exploitation of transitional challenges to generate
popular resistance and obstruct the liberal peace agenda in Kosovo.
Influenced by post-colonial discourses, Vete¨vendosje bases its manifesto
within the historical perspective that emphasises how the Albanian nation has
42John Locke, Two treatises of civil government (USA, 1953).
43Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on resistance: defying the Leviathan (Cambridge, 2010).
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been suppressed and denied the right to collective self-determination under
different colonisers and foreign occupiers.44 It considers Kosovo’s right to
collective self-determination as the most important factor for peace, stability,
progress and emancipation in Kosovo and the wider region.45 The main strategy
employed by Vete¨vendosje towards UNMIK aimed to delegitimise the mission
in the eyes of the local population, portraying its mandate as undemocratic,
colonial and constraining Kosovo’s freedom and self-determination.46 In its
manifesto, Vete¨vendosje maintains:
The UNMIK administration of Kosova is a non-democratic regime. What
else can happen with a system when the essence of its mission is the denial of
people’s will? The indeterminate duration of UNMIK’s rule has become
unbearable. Its presence is the antithesis of our self-determination. That’s
why we do not have freedom today.47
One of the first initiatives organised by Vete¨vendosje was a campaign on
missing persons, consisting of: a petition, with more than a quarter of a million
signatures collected, that called upon UNMIK and the Serbian authorities to
clarify the fate of around 3,000 missing persons in Kosovo; civil disobedience
among the families of missing persons, who refused to pay taxes and other
pubic services bills; blockage of important roads; promoting dissatisfaction
through artistic performances and publications.48 In June 2005, Vete¨vendosje
initiated one of the most visible campaigns in post-war Kosovo, which painted
slogans stating ‘No negotiations*Self-determination’ on the walls of public
buildings and private houses throughout Kosovo. This slogan became the
hallmark of Vete¨vendosje’s mission to resist the transitional processes that were
taking place in Kosovo during that time*namely the decentralisation process,
the final status negotiations and dysfunctional dynamics within and between
the UN administration and local institutions. Following this, Vete¨vendosje
established a practice of organising public protests in response to every
significant political development, disseminating posters, flyers and other
promotional materials, and began utilising print and electronic media to reach
wider audiences.49
Through its distinct repertoire of resistance, Vete¨vendosje differs from local
and international NGOs, as it combines simplicity and populism, conveying
messages that touch the essential and most desperate problems and weaknesses
in Kosovo’s politics, while also focusing its activities on small community
discussions, rural gatherings and simple public performances. Its broad scope of
ideological orientation allows Vete¨vendosje to appeal to a variety of groups:
educated students who are dis-enchanted with the political situation and want
to see positive change in Kosovo; ex-combatants who have been excluded by the
mainstream war-related parties; members of veterans’ associations; and
unemployed people who live in poverty and vulnerable conditions. Whereas
most civil society groups would not approach sensitive political issues with
44Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Movement’s Manifesto’, 15 June 2010, 3, available at: http://
vetevendosje.org/repository/docs/Manifesti.pdf (19 July 2011), hereafter cited as Le¨vizja
Vete¨vendosje, ‘Manifesto’.
45Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Manifesto’, 2.
46Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘History of Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje (Movement for Self-Determination)’,
3; available at: http://vetevendosje.org/repository/docs/Historik_i_Levizjes_VETEVENDOSJE!.
pdf (20 July 2011),hereafter cited as Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘History’.
47Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘History’, 2.
48Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘History’.
49Albin Kurti, ‘JISB interview: Kosova in dependence: from stability of crisis to the crisis of
stability’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5 (1) 2011, 94.
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radical tones, Vete¨vendosje organises public events within hours of significant
political developments. Clearly, Vete¨vendosje restored an element of public
deliberation to the most sensitive political events before and after Kosovo
independence.
Although Vete¨vendosje operated until the end of 2010 outside the
institutional space, the movement strategised to attack essentially all significant
political decisions taken by the international presence and local authorities
towards improving ethnic relations in Kosovo, and fulfilling human-rights and
democracy conditions set by the international community before determining
Kosovo’s final status. Between 2005 and 2007, Vete¨vendosje continuously
organised activities to resist the decentralisation plan, which was set forth as
one of the most important issues to accommodate Serb minority interests and
needs in Kosovo, before resolving Kosovo’s final status. At the heart of
Vete¨vendosje’s campaign was a set of messages aimed at spreading the ‘fear’
that decentralisation would lead to partition, and partition consequently would
lead to the recurrence of conflict.50 Another campaign employed by Vete¨ven-
dosje since 2008 is against Serbian products; the movement called upon Kosovo
citizens to boycott economic products imported from Serbia, arguing that
economic nationalism and trade reciprocity is necessary as a response to
Serbia’s destructive interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs. This, in turn,
increased Vete¨vendosje’s support within the business community.
During the final status talks, Vete¨vendosje continuously reacted to the
concessions Kosovo was making in relation to the special status for minorities
and their religious and cultural heritage; to decentralisation and broad self-
governance; as well as to the nature of the political system emerging after the
resolution of Kosovo’s final status. It mainly targeted the members of the
Kosovo delegation to the talks and aimed to delegitimise them personally,
calling them traitors, traders of Kosovo’s statehood and inadequate represen-
tatives. Equally, Vete¨vendosje targeted the UN mediators by creating a negative
image about their motives to constrain Kosovo’s right to self-determination. In
February 2007, Vete¨vendosje organised a demonstration to articulate popular
dissatisfaction with the provisions imposed by the international community for
settling Kosovo’s final status. Although the demonstration began peacefully it
grew threatening: UNMIK Police blocked the popular march and dramatically
overreacted, resulting in the death of two civilians and wounding hundreds
more.51 Although Vete¨vendosje was very pessimistic before and during the final
status negotiations concerning the prospects for Kosovo to become an
independent state, Ahtishaari’s Comprehensive Settlement Proposal provided
the basis for the Kosovo Assembly to declare unilaterally its independence
from Serbia. This historical landmark shook Vete¨vendosje’s popular support
and provided an excuse for the movement’s political opponents*mainly
the mainstream political parties and civil society groups*to question the
accuracy, motivations and the necessity for a social movement such as
Vete¨vendosje.
However, the constrained and supervised independence granted to Kosovo
provided fertile ground for Vete¨vendosje to reposition itself in the face of
50Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, Serbia’s plan for Kosova (Prishtina, 2006), 13, available at: http://www.
vetevendosje.org/sh/images/stories/broshura/decentralization.pdf (20 July 2011).
51Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International calls for full transparency in UNMIK
inquiry into deaths of Mon Balaj and Arbe¨n Xheladini’, AI Index: EUR 70/002/2007 (Public), 15
February 2007; see also: ‘Kosovo (Serbia): Romanian police and UNMIK must be brought to
account for the deaths of demonstrators in Kosovo’, AI Index: EUR 70/010/2007 (Public), 9 July
2007.
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critique and expand its resistance. Regarding the mandate and the nature of
EULEX, Vete¨vendosje set out a discursive framework, which intended to
delegitimise the Kosovo government for its inability to gain complete
sovereignty from the final status negotiations, but also to delegitimise the
EULEX presence by describing it as a pillar of UNMIK*neutral but equipped
with executive authorities, thereby constraining Kosovo’s internal self-govern-
ance.52 In addition, Vete¨vendosje criticises EULEX’s broad and ambiguous
mandate, which considers Kosovo a crisis management terrain and enjoys
diplomatic immunity. Vete¨vendosje argues that EULEX follows the UNMIK
tradition of remaining irresponsible and unaccountable to Kosovo’s society for
the consequences of actions undertaken by the mission.
Between 2008 and 2010, Vete¨vendosje expanded its actions to include other
civil society organisations. Following Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence,
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reconfigured UNMIK by reducing its
staff and governance functions.53 Responding to this, in 2008 Vete¨vendosje
organised a number of demonstrations denouncing the reconfigured role of
UNMIK and labelling it as harmful for Kosovo’s sovereignty and as prolonging
Serb interference on internal Kosovo issues. Vete¨vendosje reported that
together with other 20 other ‘social organisations’ it managed to mobilise
40,000 people to demonstrate against the protracted and reconfigured UN
presence, but also against EULEX, which was seen again as an operative unit of
UNMIK in Kosovo.54
During 2009, two events marked the main resistance efforts of Vete¨vendosje.
In the first, against EULEX, Vete¨vendosje activists targeted and damaged 25
cars belonging to EULEX personnel, arguing that EULEX is a mission made
in Serbia and as such it represents the interests of Serbia in Kosovo.55 Kosovo
police reacted to this and arrested over 30 activists for damaging public
property. In response, Vete¨vendosje drew parallels between the violent
behaviour of the Kosovo police and that of the Serb militias under the
Milosˇevic´ regime. Equally, Vete¨vendosje blamed the Kosovo authorities for
executing violence on behalf of internationals, by which it intended to
delegitimise action taken by the Kosovo government to enforce law and public
order. The second major event was a campaign to encourage boycotting the
local elections in Kosovo during November. Vete¨vendosje claimed that voting in
elections for the current political parties is harmful and counter-productive to
the interests of Kosovo’s people.56 Although it is difficult to speculate whether
this type of boycotting affected the local election dynamics, the subsequent low
turnout served the Vete¨vendosje discourse that the current political elite lacks
popular legitimacy and, accordingly, that the decisions of this political elite
do not represent the wide interests of Kosovo’s population.57 During 2010,
52Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘EULEX-I Shtylla e Pare¨ (e re) e UNMIK-ut’ (in English: ‘EULEX,
First (new) pillar of UNMIK’), 16 December 2008, available at: http://www.vetevendosje.org/
repository/docs/EULEX-i_Shtylla_e_pare_e_re_e_UNMIK-ut.pdf (12 August 2011), hereafter
cited as Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘EULEX’.
53Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘EULEX’, 4.
54Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Po rritet numri i demonstruesve kunde¨r 6 pike¨shit dhe EULEX-it’ (in
English: The number of demonstrators against the 6 points and EULEX is growing), 2 December
2008, available at: http://vetevendosje.org/?cid1,3,1838 (21 July 2011).
55Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘EULEX Made in Serbia’, 25 August 2009, available at: http://
vetevendosje.org/?cid1,3,1602 (21 July 2011).
56Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘MOS VOTO. Zgjedh pe¨rnje¨mend’ (in English: ‘Don’t vote. Choose for
real’), 7 November 2009, available at: http://vetevendosje.org/?cid1,3,1599 (20 July 2011).
57Kurti, ‘JISB Interview’, 93.
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Vete¨vendosje’s main activities focused on resisting the on-going privatisation of
public enterprises in Kosovo; criticising bad governance and corruption in
government; and promoting Albanian national symbols, consequently delegi-
timising Kosovo’s ‘civic’ identity as reflected in the new flag, anthem and other
symbols that had been introduced.58
The influence and impact of Vete¨vendosje’s actions towards the interna-
tional governance and local institutions in Kosovo is evident in the on-going
actions of international and local authorities, including the systematic arrest
and imprisonment of Vete¨vendosje activists. Operating within the ambiguous
legal system of Kosovo, international and local prosecutors have justified legal
cases against Vete¨vendosje activists for calling and organising demonstrations
causing public destruction; violating public peace and order; damaging public
property; and obstructing government officials in performing their work.59 The
case against Albin Kurti, for example, dragged on for nearly two years. Kurti
was arrested on 10 February 2007 for organising a demonstration at which two
protestors were killed. He was then kept in detention and later ordered under
house arrest; and, for a period of time, he was denied contact with Vete¨vendosje
activists, with the media and with international human-rights advocates, while
the vague and protracted legal case against him remained pending.
Amnesty International raised concerns that Kurti’s ‘prosecution and trial
proceedings to date appear to be politicized’, and also expressed concern in this
case ‘at the lack of independence of the judiciary’.60 Amnesty called upon the
international administrators of justice in Kosovo to initiate instead an
investigation against the Romanian UNMIK police who murdered two
protesters at the demonstration. The case against Kurti boosted Vete¨vendosje’s
popular support, including among the local judges and lawyers who refused to
deal with his case.61 As Vete¨vendosje intensified its resistance activities against
EULEX, the latter reopened Kurti’s case in February 2010, arrested him for
organising another protest in June 2010, and eventually closed the case in
favour of Kurti at the end of 2010.62 Vete¨vendosje considered the prosecution
and arrest of its activists as politically motivated acts, which targeted legitimate
and peaceful local resistance against the counter-productive and undemocratic
practices of international and local governance in Kosovo, and labelled the
Kosovo government, local police and international presence as unjust,
undemocratic and suppressive of the human rights of Kosovo citizens.63
The transformation of Vete¨vendosje into a political party and its participa-
tion in the December 2010 national elections signifies the movement’s entry into
Kosovo’s political system, while still retaining the ‘street resistance’ approach
58Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘28 Ne¨ntori nuk e¨shte¨ feste¨ pe¨r ke¨te¨ flamur, por e¨shte¨ feste¨ kombe¨tare,
e¨shte¨ feste¨ pe¨r flamurin kuq e zi’ (in English: ‘28th of November is not a holiday for this flag, but
it is a national holiday, it is a holiday for the black and red flag’), 28 November 2010, available at:
http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid1,3,2343, (21 July 2011).
59Levizja Vetevendosje, ‘The case against Albin Kurti, 20072008’, available at: http://www.
vetevendosje.org/?cid2,63 (14 August 2011).
60Amnesty International, ‘Serbia (Kosovo): Albin KurtiA politically motivated prosecution?’,
Public Statement, AI Index: EUR 70/014/2007, 10 December 2007, available at: http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/014/2007/en/fa20afdc-a73a-11dc-92495f9f850000d6/
eur700142007eng.html (15 August 2011).
61Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Pade¨gjueshme¨ria e te¨ gjithe¨ve e be¨n UNMIK-un te¨ dore¨zohet’ (in
English: ‘Collective disobedience makes UNMIK give up’), 8 February 2008, available at: http://
www.vetevendosje.org/?cid1,2,293 (15 August 2011).
62Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Arrestohet Albin Kurti’ (in English: ‘Albin Kurti arrested’), 12 June
2010, available at: http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid1,2,1645 (15 August 2011).
63Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Drejtesia e UNMIK-ut’ (in English: ‘UNMIK’s justice’), 21 January
2008, available at: http://www.vetevendosje.org/?cid1,2,250 (12 August 2011).
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that deplored that system. Despite large irregularities identified during the
election process, Vete¨vendosje established itself as the third political force in
Kosovo, winning 88,652 votes, or 12,69% of the overall vote. Consequently,
Vete¨vendosje occupied fourteen seats in the newly formed parliament, where it
is becoming the most active parliamentary party in terms of trying to hold the
government and other public authorities accountable and ensure that political
decisions are transparent to Kosovo’s citizens.64 During the first half of 2011,
Vete¨vendosje was very active within Kosovo’s parliament and outside it, where
it resisted the technical dialogue with Serbia and called for Kosovo to withdraw
from this dialogue. Vete¨vendosje sees the dialogue not only as another
concession on Kosovo’s internal sovereignty, but also as a trade-off between
the international community and Kosovo’s ruling political elite so that the latter
escapes or delays revealing its illegal and corrupted portfolios. Concerning
privatisation, for example, Vete¨vendosje uses its parliamentary position to bring
Kosovo’s prime minister, Hashim Thaci, and other senior ministers before
parliamentary hearings and question their political decisions, where Vete¨ven-
dosje has either rejected a law that it considers damaging for Kosovo’s economy,
or where it has intended to delay the passing of laws in the hope of modifying
their content towards solutions that are closer to its ideological position.65
With or without this structural transformation into a political party,
Vete¨vendosje, through its resistance actions, has emerged as a strong opposition
and popular force against domestic and foreign attempts at compromising
Kosovo’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Operating largely outside the
institutional and legal framework, Vete¨vendosje is an exemplary case of how
local resistance is articulated in an organised manner to delegetimise main-
stream international and local authorities and shape the political agenda
towards a contingent hybridity. For as much as they claim to represent local
needs and interests, their resistance is entirely motivated by political ambitions
and will to power.
KLA war veterans’ associations
The associations set up by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) war veterans
and the families of martyrs have also articulated local resistance towards the
decisions and actions of the international governance in Kosovo, largely related
to issues of transitional justice, the welfare conditions of ex-combatants and
their families and controversial political events in Kosovo. At the end of the
1999 war, the political wing of the KLA transformed into a moderate political
party (the Democratic Party of KosovoPDK), and it has been a loyal partner
of the international community before and after Kosovo’s independence. It is
seen as a collaborative partner in resolving transitional justice issues and an
influential group that manages potential peace spoilers in Kosovo. The military
wing of ex-combatants was transformed into a semi-military structure with
limited functions under international supervision (the Kosovo Protection Corps
KPC), with the remaining veterans transformed into civil society associations
for defending the values and interests of former-KLA veterans and their
64Kurti, ‘JISB Interview’, 96.
65Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Mocion pe¨r Interpelance¨’ (in English: ‘Motion for interpellation’), 4
May 2011, available at: http://vetevendosje.org/?cid1,2,2941&author0 (12 August 2011).
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families. The ex-combatants reintegrated into the KPC have been under the
direct control of UNMIK, which limited its scope to a ‘civilian emergency
service agency’ tasked to deal with disasters, humanitarian and infrastructural
reconstruction.66 The war associations sheltered under the civil society platform
have continuously benefitted from special public status, and different types of
formal and informal social welfare. The war associations have also served as a
useful mechanism for preventing potential peace spoilers from triggering public
disturbances and/or inter-ethnic confrontation, but also as a reserve ‘asset’,
when necessary, to channel the grievances of an important and influential social
group.
The most vocal among the war associations is the Organization of the KLA
War Veterans (hereafter OWV), whose primary mission entails ‘protecting the
dignity and integrity of ex-combatants, and helping ex-combatants’ families in
enjoying their rights, including their legal and social protection’.67 In its political
programme, OWV sets the goals of responding strongly to any development
that could violate and degrade respect for Kosovo’s liberation struggle. It also
aspires in the near future to Kosovo’s re-unification with Albania ‘under a
single a nation, state, and flag’.68 As far as its repertoire of actions is concerned,
OWV sets out a number of activities in its founding act, which are in
accordance with democratic practices: public official demands, petitions,
protests, demonstrations, marches, lobbying institutions and other methods
of influencing different levels of decision-making.69
Between 2005 and 2011, OWV has been mainly active in advancing the
political and social conditions of ex-combatants. It has issued public statements
on occasions when former KLA combatants were arrested by either UNMIK or
EULEX. The OWV has attacked those voices in Kosovo who question the
KLA’s war record, and it has defended the political practices of the ruling
political parties (mainly PDK) that emerged from the KLA’s political wing. In
the context of the arrest of former KLA soldiers by UNMIK justice
mechanisms, OWV invoked a delegitimising discourse towards the international
presence by emphasising the parallels between UNMIK and Serbian aggression
towards Kosovo Albanians.70 In their public appearances, OWV representatives
have warned the international presence in Kosovo that if KLA war values
continue to be degraded, the OWV will respond in unpredictable ways, thus
implicitly threatening to destabilise the situation in Kosovo, if necessary. During
the process of final status talks, on several occasions the OWV threatened
publicly that if Kosovo did not gain independence, and the KLA war record was
not respected, veterans would mobilise in defense of the general will of Kosovo’s
society.71
The OWV has also organised several small-scale protests against the arrest
of former KLA members, and against significant political decisions that
66UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, On the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps, 20
September 1999. See also: Alpaslan O¨zerdem, ‘From a ‘‘Terrorist’’ group to a ‘‘Civil Defence’’
Corps: the ‘‘Transformation’’ of the Kosovo Liberation Army’, International Peacekeeping 10 (3)
2003, 79101.
67The Programme of the Organization of the KLA War Veterans, 1; available at: http://www.
veterani.net/dokumente/programi.pdf (10 August 2011).
68The Statute of the Organization of the KLA War Veterans, Article 6, 24 January 2009;
available at: http://www.veterani.net/dokumente/statuti.pdf (10 August 2011).
69Statute of the Organization of the KLA War Veterans, Article 6.
70For more public releases concerning the arrest of former KLA soldiers, see the OWV internet
archive, available at: http://www.veterani.net/index6.html (10 August 2011).
71OWV, Press release, Prishtina, 18 February 2007, available at: http://www.veterani.net/
arkivi7.html (11 August 2011).
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influenced the political system in Kosovo. In all the protests, war veterans
expressed their dissatisfaction with the international governance of Kosovo,
and called for the withdrawal of their executive authorities and subsequent
ending of their missions in Kosovo.72 In many of its public appearances, OWV
highlighted that:
The political games of UNMIK in collaboration with Serbia resulted in
extensive consequences for the values of our liberation war, and for our
people and its future . . . the purpose of this campaign is to reject our values
for which we have paid a high price with the blood of thousands of martyrs
who died in the constant war for freedom73 . . . those who fought for freeing
its people, those who fought against the occupiers and its organized crimes,
now are being trialled and imprisoned with the orders and files compiled by
our occupier and its laws, and implemented strictly by UNMIK.74
The response of the international governance in Kosovo towards these radical
and non-inclusive voices within the war veterans’ organisation has been mainly
a combination of hybridisation and indirect confrontation, which has resulted
in rewarding them with social protection and welfare services. Indeed, the
resistance demonstrated by war veterans’ associations against the international
governance in Kosovo, by combining empathy from and connections within the
Kosovo government, as well as public threats, protest and boycotts, has
succeeded despite extensive international objection to create special welfare
conditions and legal protection for former KLA combatants, invalids and their
respective families. Responding to this, in 2000 UNMIK regulated that persons
with partial and complete physical infirmity in connection with the armed
conflict in Kosovo have the right to compensation.75 So, through these legal
provisions, over 7,000 family members of KLA members and civilians who had
lost their lives or their families in connection with the armed conflict in Kosovo
have benefitted from small pensions in the form of a social welfare allowance. In
2006, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a new law intended to improve the social
conditions of former KLA members and their families, but the SRSG did not
promulgate it until the beginning of 2007 due to insufficient funds and
disagreements on the terminology of the law.76 While this law was primarily
dedicated to former KLA members and their families, UNMIK tried to expand
its scope of beneficiaries to other civilians damaged and affected by the conflict
in Kosovo.77 The continuous protests and pressure from the KLA war veterans’
associations had a strong effect in passing this costly and controversial
legislation. This illustrates how local agency influenced the international
governance agenda, which was concerned with prioritising stability over justice,
72OWV, Press release, Prishtina, 19 July 2010, available at: http://www.veterani.net/arkivi17.
html (10 August 2011).
73OWV, Press release, Prishtina, 29 May 2010, available at: http://www.veterani.net/index3.
html (14 August 2011).
74OWV, Public reaction, Prishtina, 17 February 2006, available at: http://www.veterani.net/
index3.html (14 August 2011).
75UNMIK Regulation 2000/66, ‘On the privileges for war invalids in Kosovo and for next-of-
kin of persons who lost their lives because of the armed conflict in Kosovo’, 21 December 2000.
76Assembly of Kosovo, ‘Law on the status and the rights of the families of martyrs, invalids,
veterans, and members of the KLA and of the families of civilian victims of the armed conflict in
Kosovo’, 23 February 2006.
77UNMIK Regulation 2006/29, ‘On the promulgation of the law on the status and the rights of
the families of martyrs, invalids, veterans, and members of the KLA and of the families of civilian
victims of the armed conflict in Kosovo adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo’, 2 May 2006.
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and coping with influential actors in Kosovo to ensure local consent and
support, while attempting to establish a liberal state in practice.
Kosovo Women’s Network
Local resistance towards the decisions and actions of the international pre-
sence in Kosovo has also taken hybrid forms, combining institutional and
cooperative techniques, as well as more contentious forms of resistance,
including public protests and silent forms of non-cooperation. An example of
such an approach is that taken by the ‘Kosova Women’s Network’ (KWN), a
network of around 80 women’s NGOs and associations in Kosovo whose
mission is to ‘support, protect and promote the rights and the interests of
women and girls throughout Kosova, regardless of their political beliefs,
religion, age, level of education, sexual orientation and ability’.78 Within its
institutional and cooperative wing, KWN has drawn on its partnership with
UN development agencies and other international NGOs and local government
to improve the institutional position of women during the UN administration,
increase women’s participation in local governance and improve their well-being
and social position on an everyday level. This productive relationship between
local and international stakeholders, along with the broad support it receives
from the women’s community, has enabled KWN to play an influential role in
developing gender-related legislation, putting pressure on the international
presence to address more effectively women’s issues in Kosovo, and creating
broader public awareness of the subordinated status of women and the
incidence of domestic/gender violence within Kosovo society.
During 2005, KWN managed to meet several times with the UNMIK
SRSG, UN Special Envoy Kai Aide, and other senior UN officials in New
York, where it took the opportunity to complain about the ‘lack of gender
mainstreaming in UNMIK and women’s participation in status talks’.79 KWN
also collaborated with Amnesty International to channel its concerns to a wider
international audience. Through the Regional Women’s Lobby for Peace,
Security and Justice in Southeast Europe, KWN has addressed several
advocacy letters to the UN Security Council and UNMIK in Kosovo. Around
the time of Kosovo’s final status talks in 2007, as a result of what KWN
described as the ‘unjust exclusion of women from the negotiations on the future
status of Kosovo’, the network expressed its gender-related position and
encouraged the UN Security Council to ‘ensure that a new resolution on
Kosovo recognizes that human security for all women and men is a cornerstone
of sustainable peace in Kosovo and in the region, and must also be ensured’.80
Reminding the UN Security Council of the failure of UNMIK to implement
UNSC resolution 1325, which calls for women’s inclusion in post-conflict
decision-making,81 the KWN, through a joint Kosovo and Serbian women’s
78KWN mission statement, available at: http://www.womensnetwork.org/15ourmission_
english.html (14 August 2011).
79KWN, ‘Annual report 2005’, 7, available at: http://www.womensnetwork.org/images/pdf/
kwn%20annual%20report%202005.pdf (10 August 2011).
80Regional Women’s Lobby, Letter to UN Security Council, Vienna, 19 April 2007, available
at: http://www.womensnetwork.org/images/pdf/al/Regional%20Womens%20Lobby%20Letter%
20to%20UNSC.pdf (10 August 2011).
81UN Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325 (2000), 31 October 2000. The text
of this resolution is available at: http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf (14 September 2011).
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peace coalition, lobbied that the new international presence should ‘steadily
involve women in all monitoring processes’.82
Parallel to consolidating institutional support, KWN has also articulated its
mission through public demonstrations, women’s mobilisation and different
forms of pressure. For example, it organised annual small-scale public protests
on International Women’s Day, where it promoted slogans such as ‘We want
power, no more flowers’, and called for the greater involvement of women in
politics and more investment in women’s security and welfare. Equally, KWN
assisted women from families with missing persons, to bring a stronger voice to
international and local decision-makers for resolving the issue of missing
persons and provide security for their families. Such initiatives include small-
scale public performances, non-cooperation with the international presence and
petitions of different scales. An example of this type of resistance occurred
during 2006, when local women in the village of Krusha e Vogel rejected an
investigaton visit by UNMIK police and local Serbs who where collecting
information for a transitional justice case. Most of the men of this village had
been killed or were missing following the war, so the women wanted to take the
opportunity to ask the local Serbs who had left the village after the war about
the fate of their missing man. UNMIK police rejected this and in turn triggered
resistance from the local community as well as use of violence by UNMIK
police. KWN raised its voice in relation to the overreaction of members of the
UNMIK police, describing the resistance and violence that occurred during the
visit to the village as follows:
. . .the women from Krusha e Vogel sat in the middle of the road, preventing
the UNMIK armored vehicles from moving forward. The UNMIK police
officers grabbed the women by the shoulders and arms, physically, forcibly
moving them from the road. When the women struggled, the police officers
began to use riot batons. The women responded by throwing stones at the
UNMIK police officers and vehicles. In the meantime, men saw what was
happening and came to protect the women. When the men came, some of the
UNMIK police officers started their vehicles, while others continued to hit
the villagers with the butts of their guns and riot batons. Then, all of the
officers jumped in their armored vehicles. As they drove away, they threw tear
gas from their moving vehicles at the citizens until they reached the edge of
the village. They also threw tear gas near the school where children were
playing during recess.83
Through combining hybrid forms of resistance, KWN has succeeded in
shaping the government’s agenda on gender issues, thereby strengthening the
legal protection of women, and consolidating a strong network of women’s
organisations that safeguard women’s rights from local level to the high political
levels. The table below summarises the nature and articulation of different types
of local resistance in Kosovo. The section of the paper that follows then
analyses some of the implications of the different types of local resistance in
post-conflict Kosovo.
82Women’s Peace Coalition, Letter to Martti Ahtisaari, 12 February 2007, available at: http://
www.womensnetwork.org/images/pdf/al/Womens%20Peace%20Coalition%20Letter%20to%
20Mr.%20Ahtisaari.pdf (10 August 2011).
83KWN Letter to Søren Jessen-Peterson, UNMIK special representative to the secretary-
general, 25 May 2006, 1, available at: http://www.womensnetwork.org/images/pdf/al/KWN%
20Letter%20to%20SRSG%20regarding%20Krusha.pdf (10 August 2011).
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Table 1. Types of local resistance in Kosovo.
Entity Mission Repertoire of resistance Outcomes
Le¨vizja
Vete¨ven-
dosje (Movement
for Self-
determination)
 External and internal
self-determination for
Kosovo’s majority
population.
 Participatory democracy
and active citizenry.
 Strong public order, rule
of law and territorial
integrity.
 Social justice, economic
protectionism and
welfare state.
 Popular
demonstrations.
 Citizen mobilisation
and education.
 Public performances,
slogans and media
communication.
 Campaigns for ‘naming
and shaming’ political
leaders.
 Hidden forms
of resistance through
everyday acts of
disobedience.
 Ignite active citizenry
and public
participation.
 Influence the political
agenda of international
and local authority.
 Promote exclusionary
practices towards
dominant and non-
dominant minorities.
 Re-inforce and re-
actualise ethnic
cleavages.
 Increase the potential
impact of
parliamentary
opposition.
KLA War
Veterans’
Associations
 Protect the dignity
and integrity of ex-
combatants.
 Defend KLA’s war record
and honour.
 Help ex-combatants’
families to exercise their
rights, including their
right to legal and social
protection.
 Political pressure
through public
statements and media
appearances.
 Slow-scale protests and
threats against the
international presence.
 Re-inforce nationalist
values and discourse.
 Challenge transitional
justice and the
emergence of moderate
social groups.
 Antagonise minority
communities and
challenge inter-ethnic
reconciliation.
Kosovo Women’s
Network
 Support, protect and
promote the rights and
the interests of women
and girls in Kosovo.
 Institutional and
cooperative techniques.
 Symbolic public
protests, citizen
mobilisation and
education, and other
subtle forms of non-
cooperation.
 Improve the
institutional and legal
conditions for women.
 Increase social
awareness about
women’s rights.
 Increase women’s
participation in
politics.
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THE PROMISE AND IMPLICATIONS OF LOCAL RESISTANCE
Theorists of post-liberal peace argue that peace-building-as-resistance has the
potential to lead to emancipation, but also to other uncertain forms of
politics.84 For instance, Richmond recognises the dual implications of peace-
building-as-resistance, which can either ‘revitalise the liberal social contract and
give these externally constructed states substance’, or it can enable ‘a more
proactive encounter between the liberal peace and its others, in which the
hegemonic weight of the liberal peace project is finally countermanded’.85
Aware of the ambiguous and sensitive nature of local resistance, Richmond
argues that the ‘everyday’ in post-liberal peace should not be seen as a binary
exclusion, where the local prevails over the international, or the non-liberal over
the liberal, but should rather be ‘a site where these meet and are negotiated,
leading variously to repulsion, modification or acceptance, and hybridity’.86
In the same line of reasoning, Mac Ginty argues that ‘hybridity is often
problematic and not necessarily pacific’, and that it can take forms of inclusion
and tolerance as well as exclusion and confrontation.87 Indeed, the dual
implications of peace-building-as-resistance anticipated by Richmond seem to
capture the practice of local resistance in Kosovo, which has led to several
implications that walk, and sometimes cross, a thin line between ethical,
emancipatory and exclusionary practices.
In terms of ethical and emancipatory implications, local resistance could
represent a revitalisation of politics, whereby bottom-up initiatives attempt to
safeguard the pluralist nature of public affairs, critique the authority and
legitimacy of local and international governance, ignite citizen activism and
hold the government accountable and responsible for its actions. Traces of an
ethical resistance and emancipation were evident in the activities of the Kosovo
Women’s Network. Conversely, local resistance that aims towards mono-ethnic
emancipation, while also ignoring the distinct identity and rights of minority
communities in Kosovo, risks further segregating the society, and effectively
delaying any form of ethnic reconciliation and the establishment of inclusive
social cohesion. This is particularly the case with Vete¨vendosje, and to lesser
extent with the war veteran’s associations. Although Vete¨vendosje might be seen
as a promising political platform to overcome fragile governance and poverty in
Kosovo, the movement’s ideological mixture and conceptual inconsistencies,
together with its intentional and unintentional dimensions, promote exclu-
sionary practices. A closer reading of Vete¨vendosje’s party manifesto reveals
that, in terms of ideological orientation, Vete¨vendosje cannot be located into a
single and coherent ideological framework. From the right, Vete¨vendosje
espouses those policies that promote Kosovo’s national interest, aim to reclaim
internal and external autonomy, seek unification with Albania, dismiss
minority interests and advocate the establishment of a strong rule of law,
public order and territorial integrity. From the left, Vete¨vendosje promotes a
more socialist and welfare-oriented economic order, political and civil free-
doms, public deliberations and an active citizenry, as well as internal and local
self-governance and self-determination.
84Tadjbakhsh, Rethinking the liberal peace; Richmond, Post-liberal peace; Mac Ginty,
International peacebuilding and local resistance.
85Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, 686.
86Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’, 672.
87Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding and local resistance, 210. For an authentic analysis of
the notion of hybridity, see: Bhabha, The location of culture.
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At the heart of Vete¨vendosje’s ideology lies the notion of emancipation-
through-self-determination. Although Vete¨vendosje’s emancipatory priorities
reflect the situation on the ground that needs immediate change, a closer
examination of this emancipatory programme reveals a set of exclusionary
practices, which can cause unintended, unanticipated and undesirable con-
sequences. Some of the obvious exclusionary practices of Vete¨vendosje towards
minorities incude: ridiculing and raising public anger over Serb monastic land
set-asides; promoting a boycott of Serbian products; reviling Serbian municipal
autonomy; using anti-Serb emotive messaging and war images; and advocating
elimination of reserved seats in parliament for minorities. To reveal some of the
implications of Vete¨vendosje’s ‘emancipatory programme’, the critique pro-
vided by Ernesto Laclau on the notion of emancipation is worth considering.
Laclau argues that within the notion of emancipation there are incompatible
and contradicting dimensions: where emancipation claims universal destiny and
sameness, but it is generated by particular motivations and grounds; where it
claims liberation and equality, but it ultimately encourages exclusion and
division; where it claims the unity of parts into a totality, but by invoking the
pre-existence of distinct identity it encourages further separation; where it
claims social equality and totality, but in practice it reinforces hierarchical
structures and practices.88 This paraphrase of Laclau’s argument pertains
particularly to Vete¨vendosje’s ‘emancipatory discourse’.
In the case of Vete¨vendosje, a similar situation of emancipation-through-
exclusion is evident. Vete¨vendosje’s vision of emancipation and self-determina-
tion is exclusionary towards the minority communities in Kosovo, and those
who support Kosovo’s distinct statehood and identity. By invoking a discourse
of abolishing ethnic identity and creating a new common civic identity,
Vete¨vendosje denies implicitly the rights of minorities to manifest their ethnic,
cultural and political identity free from any external interference. Equally,
practices engaged in by Vete¨vendosje to make Kosovo a state of Albanians and
‘other’ citizens serve to antagonise minority communities, who have gradually
come to accept Kosovo’s new identity after the 2008 independence. This is
evident in the party manifesto:
Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje is committed to the constitutional definition of Kosova
as a state of Albanians and all citizens of Kosova. Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje in
addition is committed to returning the national Albanian symbols to the
state of Kosova.89
By invoking this new discourse of civic democracy and civic identity in
Kosovo, Vete¨vendosje attempts to discourage the majority community from
supporting Kosovo’s new identity, but also expects minority communities to
abandon their distinct religious and cultural identity and join Vete¨vendosje to
lead to the creation of a new social contract. Indeed, one could argue that these
discursive and affirmative practices of Vete¨vendosje as articulated through
media propaganda, public protests and other public manifestation are more
harmful*in terms of disturbing the fragile peace and social order in Kosovo*
than a promising change for Kosovo’s society.
It could be argued that, although Vete¨vendosje subscribes to the principles
of (physical) nonviolence, its discursive and affirmative action can cause
physiological violence to minority communities in different instances and
88Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London and New York, 1996), 17.
89Le¨vizja Vete¨vendosje, ‘Short political programme’, December 2010, available at: http://
vetevendosje.org/repository/docs/Programi_i_shkurte_anglisht.pdf (22 July 2011).
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through different manifestations. Related to these discursive practices of
Vete¨vendosje, a leading Serb community representative, Slobodan Petrovic´,
has argued that the ‘idea for the partition of Kosovo between Kosovo and
Albania is supported by the extreme right political forces represented by the
Movement for Self-Determination of Albin Kurti’.90 Petrovic´ has pointed out
the devastating consequences of such logic for the Serb community in Kosovo,
as well as for the wider region. Much stronger fearful reactions to Vete¨ven-
dosje’s practices are evident among those minority communities who are
gradually integrating into Kosovo society and fear a recurrence of violence and
further marginalisation.
Similar exclusionary practices are also evident in the resistance of war
veterans’ associations. The action to protect KLA values, re-inforces nationalist
values, and the veterans’ preconceived ownership of popular legitimacy
supporting their actions has blocked in several instances the process of
transitional justice, while preventing the emergence of more moderate social
groups who value difference and pluralism.91 In particular, such articulated
nationalist resistance by war associations antagonises minority communities, as
well as challenging inter-ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo.
The notion of excluding others through the attempts to emancipate an
imaginary collectivity can be explained by Chantal Mouffe’s critique of liberal
democracy and her proposal for an agonistic model of democracy. Mouffe
holds that, in order to maintain liberal values and principles such as equality
and liberty, the challenge is not ‘how to eliminate power but how to constitute
forms of power more compatible with democratic values’.92 She recognises that
the nature of politics and the political in itself expose hegemonic and
exclusionary tendencies, which can only temporarily be reconciled through a
consensual logic of seeing other political counterparts not as enemies, but as
adversaries. Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is an interesting idea, which seeks to
transform social antagonism into a common symbolic space where difference,
tolerance, but also struggle, hegemony and exclusion, are handled in such a way
that they do not harm democratic principles.93
By way of recognising the inherent contradictions of emancipation, moving
the political struggle between social and political forces within an institutional
framework is a promising alternative to reconcile differences, balance domina-
tion tendencies and prevent the exclusion of the subaltern. Relevant to Kosovo,
the transformation of Vete¨vendosje into a political party can signify a new
‘agonistic confrontation and pluralism’ within Kosovo’s political institutions,
where the relatively high number of parliamentary seats gained by Vete¨vendosje
in recent elections and those allocated to minority political representatives
could either close the gap between their programmatic and ideological
differences, or intensify nationalist discourses, while blocking political processes
from both sides by using parliamentary power and other constitutional and
institutional mechanisms and constraints. Such indications are evident, but not
yet significant.94
90‘Petrovic kunde¨r ndarjes’ (in English: ‘Petrovic against the partition’), Gazeta Express 6 June
2011, available at: http://gazetaexpress.com/?cid1,13,55280 (07 June 2011).
91For a more detailed account of this issue, see: Alpasan O¨zerdem, ‘From a ‘‘terrorist group’’
to a ‘‘civil defence corps’’: the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army’, International
Peacekeeping 10 (3) (2003), 79101.
92Chantal Mouffe, The democratic paradox (London, 2005), 100.
93Mouffe, Democratic paradox, 13.
94Ge¨zim Visoka, ‘The obstacles to sustainable peace and democracy in post-independence
Kosovo’, Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security 1 (2) 2011, 2737.
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CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the discourse of local resistance, and the repertoire of resistance
actions evidenced in Kosovo, illustrates how local resistance emerges largely as
a result of the unfulfilled promises of liberal peace-building, whereby
institutions and rights are prioritised over local needs and interests, peace
and stability over justice and development, and external values and principles
are privileged over the local culture and context. Mainstream accounts
of peace-building and state-building in Kosovo have largely ignored non-
institutional dynamics and peripheral local agency in post-conflict transitions.
They have instead focused on larger structural, legal and political factors that
constrain or facilitate the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of
a stable peace. In return, critical approaches to peace-building consider local
resistance as an articulation of local agency, which influences the mainstream
governance policies and practices towards a hybridity between the local and the
international. In that approach, local resistance highlights the disfunctionalities
of liberal peace, and thus favours alternative forms of politics to reclaim
subjectivity and agency by delegitimising and destabilising the inconvenient
social order. In line with this, local resistance movements from the margins of
society in Kosovo aimed at addressing those issues that mainstream political
parties, civil society and labour forces failed to address effectively. These local
movements used the weapons developed by ‘powerless’ local resistance move-
ments worldwide to disturb the mainstream post-conflict politics; thus
reflecting resilience and agency.
In general, local resistance has the potential to revitalise the political life of a
society, where bottom-up initiatives attempt to: safeguard the pluralist nature
of public affairs; critique the contested legitimacy and authority of local and
international governance; ignite citizen activism; and hold governments
accountable and responsible for their actions. In the Kosovo context, this
aspect of local agency and resilience and the potential to shape the international
governance agenda continues to remain under-researched. These observations
notwithstanding, the analysis of local resistance in Kosovo highlighted in this
article explores some of the limitations and implications of local agency and
emancipatory practices. As examined in this article, local resistance can also
take paths that, in order to justify its discursive and affirmative actions, while
promoting nationalist ideology and denying ethnic differences and pluralism in
society, often result in exclusionary practices that risk affecting the subalterns
who belong to minority and vulnerable communities. In Kosovo, for instance,
Vete¨vendosje combined popular protests, creative campaigns and local
deliberations to propagate the right to self-determination, and to target the
protracted and exclusive powers of the regime of international governance in
Kosovo as the main obstruction towards achieving that goal. Its discourse,
however, has immanent implications for redesigning the character of the state,
deepening ethnic division and excluding the subaltern. Equally, war veterans
have used political pressure, public appearances, low-scale protests and
discursive threats against the international presence in Kosovo, to protect ex-
combatants from transitional justice processes, as well as proactively to improve
their own legal situation and well-being. On the other hand, the Kosovo
Women’s Network has shown more sophisticated skills in combining institu-
tional and cooperative approaches, as well as more contentious resistance
through public protests and other hidden and silent forms of non-cooperation,
to protect and improve women’s rights and welfare conditions in Kosovo.
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In sum, from the analysis of local resistance in Kosovo, we can assert that
such resistance does not resolve entirely problems of local ownership, grass
roots democratisation, or the emancipation and empowerment of local agency,
because there is a persistent danger that subalterns articulate their needs and
interests in a public transcript acceptable to the inner group dynamics, but also
acceptable in relation to the dominant authority, whether it is local or
international. This logic was developed decades ago by Walzer, who argued
that the very act of disobedience to some type of broader authority is an act of
obedience to a narrower authority, which is bound by the perceived collective
identity and solidarity.95 This dynamic signifies that where there is power there
will be resistance, and where there is resistance there will be exclusion and
further subordination. Consequently, emancipatory politics should not be seen
as an ultimate solution to post-conflict problems, but instead, the ethos and
nexus of emancipation should remain the ‘immanent critique’ of dominance
and power relations within and between social groups. Equally, international
policy-makers should not ignore the influential role that public and hidden
forms of resistance pose to post-conflict transformations.
95Michael Walzer, Obligations: essays on disobedience, war, and citizenship (Cambridge, MA,
1970).
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